United Nations S/2013/342

Security Council

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11 June 2013
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 10 June 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I should like to affirm to you and, through you, all the members of the Security Council that the Government of the Sudan, desirous of normalizing relations with the Republic of South Sudan, signed the nine cooperation agreements in good faith. Those agreements were meant to be implemented jointly by both parties in a coordinated and simultaneous fashion, as set out in the joint cooperation agreement. You are certainly aware that the agreement on security arrangements is key to the successful implementation of all the agreements. In that connection, we would like to recall that the President of South Sudan, Mr. Salva Kiir, made a commitment to honour that agreement in his letter addressed to the Chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel.

Unfortunately, however, experience and conclusive evidence have made it clear that the Government of South Sudan did not sincerely intend to halt its support for the rebel movements affiliated with the so-called Sudanese Revolutionary Front, and that it chooses to implement certain agreements, but not others. As of Friday, 8 June 2013, it was continuing to provide political, military and logistical support to rebel movements in Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. We would like to draw your attention to the following evidence:

- The leadership of the General Staff of the South Sudan People's Liberation Army continues to provide direct support to the rebel movements. This being done under the supervision of General Paul Maj and through the Government's representative in Juba, Izzat Kuku. In addition, officers and other members of the so-called Sudanese Revolutionary Front are still enlisted in and receive a salary from the People's Liberation Army;
- The most recent example of the provision of logistical support was the dispatch on Friday, 8 June 2013, of fuel tankers from Juba and Unity state to Sudanese Revolutionary Front forces in Southern Kordofan;
- The Government of the South Sudan has continued to provide the rebel movements with large numbers of four-wheel drive vehicles and spare parts, as well as arms and ammunition;
- The Government of South Sudan is also evacuating the wounded of the rebel movements. Some 175 persons wounded in recent operations are being treated in hospitals located in Waw, Bentiu and Juba in South Sudan;

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- In addition, South Sudan has not withdrawn fully the forces of the People's Liberation Army from the territory of the Sudan, in particular from Benbis, Bahr al-Arab Station, northern Timsahah, parts of Lake Abyad, Juwda, Tashwin, Samahah and Adham. It has also failed to redeploy outside the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone. In his letter of 15 May 2013, the commander of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei confirms that South Sudan still had troops in that area.

When the Government of the Sudan obtained material evidence and documents that confirm the provision of the above-mentioned support, it chose to draw the attention of the Government of South Sudan to this matter in several bilateral contacts, in order to clarify how dangerous it was, and sought to make the Government of South Sudan desist from supporting the rebel movements, in accordance with the agreement on security arrangements. In that connection, the Government of the Sudan sent the Deputy Director of Military Intelligence and the Deputy Director of the National Security and Intelligence Agency to present officials of the South Sudan Government with irrefutable evidence of their Government's ongoing support for the rebel movements. In view of the Government of South Sudan's persistence in supporting the rebel movements, the Government of the Sudan then dispatched the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Security and Intelligence Agency, who, on behalf of the President of the Republic, met the President of South Sudan, Mr. Salva Kiir, in Juba and presented him with evidence that confirmed his Government's ongoing support for the rebels. They requested him to intervene personally in order to end this support. When those contacts failed to yield results, the President of the Republic, Mr. Omer Hassan A. Al-Bashir, personally raised this matter with the President of South Sudan when they met on the margins of the African summit meeting that was recently held in Addis Ababa.

When bilateral efforts with South Sudan aimed at ending its continuing support for the rebels failed, the Government of the Sudan was forced to take the decision that the oil pipelines would be shut off within 60 days of Sunday, 9 June 2013, in accordance with the agreement concerning oil concluded between the two countries.

Based on the foregoing, I call on the esteemed Council to support the efforts of the African Union to ensure that South Sudan fulfils it commitment to halt all forms of assistance, whether military, political or logistical, it is providing to the Sudanese Revolutionary Front. This should be done in a reliable and verifiable manner.

I should be grateful if this letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali **Osman**
Permanent Representative of the Sudan

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United Nations S/2013/343

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 June 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 7 June 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), established as requested by the Security Council in its Presidential statement dated 7 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/5).

Following the usual consultations, I would like to inform you of my intention to appoint Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye (Senegal) as my new Special Representative and Head of BINUCA. He will succeed Ms. Margaret Vogt (Nigeria), who has served as my Special Representative since April 2011. Lieutenant General Gaye, who currently serves as Assistant Secretary-General and Military Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations, brings to this position many years of diplomatic, political and military experience with the United Nations system and his national Government. I am confident that he will be an asset to BINUCA and will help lead United Nations efforts to support the Central African Republic at this crucial time.

I should like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Ms. Vogt for her dedicated service, in extraordinarily challenging circumstances, during her tenure at BINUCA.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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S/2013/344

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United Nations S/2013/344

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 June 2013

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Letter dated 11 June 2013 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 7 June 2013 (S/2013/343) concerning your intention to appoint Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye (Senegal) as your Special Representative for the Central African Republic and Head of the United Nations Organization Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Mark **Lyall Grant**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations S/2013/345

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 June 2013

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period from 1 April to 30 June 2013

I. Introduction

1. The present report gives an account of the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) during the past three months, from 1 April to 30 June 2013, pursuant to the mandate contained in Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and extended by subsequent resolutions, most recently through resolution 2084 (2012).

II. Situation in the area and activities of the Force

2. During the reporting period, the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic was generally maintained, albeit in an increasingly volatile environment attributable to the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. Violations of the ceasefire by both sides are set out below. The Syrian Arab armed forces continued to deploy personnel and equipment inside the area of separation and carried out military activities and security operations against armed members of the opposition in the UNDOF area of operation. Inside the area of separation, the presence of the Syrian armed forces and unauthorized military equipment is in violation of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israeli and Syrian forces.

3. In the context of the ongoing clashes between the Syrian Arab armed forces and armed members of the opposition, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) fired across the ceasefire line in what they considered to be retaliation for fire from the Bravo side that had reportedly landed in the Alpha side. On 2 and 12 April, the Liaison Officer of the Government of Israel informed UNDOF that IDF soldiers on a routine night-time patrol west of the technical fence had been fired at by individuals from the Bravo side. IDF fired two tank rounds on 2 April and two anti-tank missiles on 12 April into the area of separation in what they considered to be retaliatory fire. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate, the main interlocutor for UNDOF on the Bravo side, informed UNDOF that one person had been killed and another had been injured in the 12 April incident. On 20 May, IDF informed UNDOF that an IDF night-time patrol along the technical fence had been hit by fire from a Syrian Arab armed forces position. UNDOF was not able to confirm the incident. On the same day, IDF informed UNDOF that it would return fire in any future incident of that

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kind. UNDOF requested the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate to take all measures necessary to ensure that no further firing would occur across the ceasefire line. In the early morning hours of 21 May, Syrian authorities informed UNDOF that IDF had fired two missiles at a Syrian armed forces position in the vicinity of Bir Ajam. Subsequently, IDF informed UNDOF that they had fired two missiles at a Syrian Arab armed forces position in the vicinity of Bir Ajam in response to heavy machine gun fire from the position, which had hit, for the second time, an IDF patrol in the vicinity of Zbedah al-Gharbia in the area of limitation on the Alpha side. IDF also informed UNDOF that while there had been no injuries to IDF soldiers, an IDF vehicle had been damaged.

4. In identical letters dated 21 May addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations stated that his country had exercised its right to self-defence in response to an Israeli vehicle that had reportedly crossed the ceasefire line and the launch of two missiles by IDF from the area of Tall al-Faras (see S/2013/303). On 23 May, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed identical letters to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council in which he stated that, on 21 May, the Syrian Arab armed forces had opened fire on an IDF patrol on the Alpha side and that IDF, acting in self-defence, had fired back at the outpost from which the fire had originated (see S/2013/314). All firing into the area of separation and across the ceasefire line are violations of the Disengagement Agreement.

5. Intense clashes between the Syrian Arab armed forces and armed members of the opposition continued in Jabbata, Trunje, Ufaniyah, Al Horaye, Al Quatanyia, Jaba, Bir Ajam and Braika in the area of separation. Small arms firing from inside the area of separation and artillery, mortar, main battle tank, machine gun and anti-aircraft gun firing from the area of limitation on the Bravo side occurred on a daily basis. Clashes between the Syrian Arab armed forces and armed members of the opposition also continued in the areas of Khan Arnabeh, Al Baath and New Hamediya, mainly along the main UNDOF supply road. Intensive shelling was observed towards Bayt Jinn, with Syrian Arab armed forces troops moving into the area in pursuit of armed members of the opposition. Since the end of January, a Syrian armed forces main battle tank and an anti-aircraft gun have remained in the area of separation in the vicinity of Khan Arnabeh and at Al Qunaytirah, respectively, in violation of the Disengagement Agreement. In addition, since the end of May, three armoured personnel carriers have been stationed at the Syrian Arab armed forces checkpoint at the entrance to the area of separation.

6. In the early morning hours of 6 June, armed members of the opposition who had gathered in areas to the east of United Nations positions 60 and 60A launched an attack on the town of Al Quneitra, cutting off the main road from the town and the Bravo gate (the transit point on the Bravo side to and from the Israeli-occupied Golan, maintained by Syrian authorities) to Damascus. The Syrian Arab armed forces immediately reinforced their presence in the UNDOF area of operation. The ensuing shelling and clashes between the Syrian Arab armed forces and the armed members of the opposition engulfed the central part of the area of operation to the north and south of the main road, between Camp Ziouani on the Alpha side (Israeli-occupied Golan) and Camp Faouar on the Bravo side. UNDOF reported shelling in the vicinity of Khan Arnabeh, Al Samdaniyah and Trunje, and mortar fire in the vicinity of United Nations observation post 52, in the area of separation. Tank shells

and mortars landed in the vicinity of United Nations position 60A. As a result of the fighting, Camp Ziouani was hit by a total of 34 indirect mortars and heavy-machine gun fire. Two UNDOF military personnel at Camp Ziouani sustained minor injuries. A number of buildings in the Camp, including accommodation blocks and the logistics office, sustained light damage; communication lines were affected temporarily and subsequently restored.

7. All United Nations personnel in positions located in the affected area took shelter in their positions. UNDOF personnel at the Charlie gate (which is on the ceasefire line and is manned by UNDOF) relocated temporarily to the Alpha side. All UNDOF personnel present at Camp Ziouani took shelter at the Camp. During the clashes, armed members of the opposition took control temporarily of the Bravo gate. After several hours of clashes between the Syrian Arab armed forces and the armed members of the opposition, the former gained control of the Bravo gate. By noon on 6 June, the fighting in the area had subsided, albeit with continued sporadic shelling. On the following day, 7 June, the Alpha, Bravo and Charlie gates, which had been closed throughout the clashes, reopened.

8. During the clashes on 6 June, and following reports that tanks of the Syrian Arab armed forces were moving in the general area between Kahn Arnabeh and Al Quineitra, the UNDOF Force Commander immediately asked the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate that the tanks be withdrawn as their presence was a violation of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement. Subsequently, IDF informed the UNDOF Force Commander that should the tanks continue to move in the vicinity of Al Quneitra or should any shelling land on the Alpha side, IDF would take action. The UNDOF Force Commander conveyed the IDF message to the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate, who took action to have the tanks withdrawn and emphasized that the presence of the tanks was solely for the purpose of fighting the armed opposition and asked that IDF not take action. Late in the day on 6 June, two armoured personnel carriers of the Syrian Arab armed forces remained at the Bravo gate, in violation of the Disengagement Agreement.

9. The Syrian authorities informed UNDOF that five Syrian Arab armed forces personnel had been killed, including two of the five unarmed Liaison Officers of the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate at the Bravo gate. A third Liaison Officer of the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate had been abducted by armed members of the opposition. The Liaison Officer of the Government of Israel informed UNDOF that IDF had provided emergency medical treatment to 20 armed members of the opposition, all of whom had been returned to the Bravo side, according to IDF.

10. Throughout the fighting, the UNDOF Force Commander remained in close contact with both sides, stressing the importance of exercising maximum restraint, in an effort to prevent an escalation of the situation across the ceasefire line and ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel.

11. In making its best effort to maintain the ceasefire and to see that it is scrupulously observed, as prescribed by the 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Israeli and Syrian forces, UNDOF reports all breaches of the ceasefire line. UNDOF observed and reported instances of continued transborder movements of unidentified individuals, some of them armed, between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic in the northern part of the area of separation. Since 1 April, the frequency with which UNDOF observed civilians, mainly women and children, moving along the same route has increased slightly.

12. Syrian security forces maintained the checkpoints established inside the area of separation since they began military operations in the area. In addition, Syrian Arab armed forces personnel maintained checkpoints at the eastern entrances to the area of separation to control and restrict traffic. The checkpoints have often interfered with the freedom of movement of UNDOF and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) military observers operationally integrated into the Force as Observer Group Golan. Restrictions on the movement of UNDOF and the Observer Group Golan in the areas of separation and limitation increased as a result of the clashes between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition. The situation resulted in the frequent closure of the UNDOF main supply road, thus hampering the movements of UNDOF between Camp Faouar on the Bravo side and Camp Ziouani on the Alpha side. UNDOF frequently resorted to the use of bypass roads, which are not accessible at night. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate advised UNDOF that, for security reasons, all United Nations personnel should avoid areas where there were clashes and that UNDOF should not carry out night-time patrols.

13. On occasion, during clashes between Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition, direct and indirect fire landed in the vicinity of United Nations installations, forcing United Nations personnel to seek shelter. On 1 April, UNDOF observed gunfire and several detonations close to United Nations position 31 and observation post 72, inside the area of separation. On 25 April and 30 May, artillery shells detonated in close proximity to United Nations position 37, while on 10 May machine-gun fire hit the outer perimeter wall of the same position. There was no injury to United Nations personnel. The detonations damaged the buildings inside the position. On two occasions, on 21 April and 5 May, shots were fired at UNDOF patrols carrying out activities in clearly marked United Nations vehicles in the vicinity of Hadar and Hanud, respectively, in the area of separation. There was no injury to United Nations personnel.

14. On 7 May, four UNDOF personnel travelling in two United Nations vehicles (near United Nations position 86) were intercepted by a large group of armed persons that identified itself as the Al Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade. The group forcibly took the UNDOF personnel to Al Jamlah village in the area of limitation on the Bravo side. Throughout the incident, the United Nations and other interlocutors used various channels to secure the release of the peacekeepers (for example, UNDOF and the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate liaised closely) and in an attempt to halt the fighting in Al Jamlah, where the peacekeepers were being held. On 12 May, the peacekeepers were released safely and in good health.

15. On the same day, after the abduction of the four peacekeepers, 10 armed persons forced a peacekeeper at the UNDOF outpost 86A sentry box at gunpoint to leave and stole a United Nations radio and binoculars. Another group of 10 armed persons approached United Nations position 86 and demanded that the remaining 8 military personnel vacate the position. The UNDOF soldiers refused and, after a prolonged stand-off, the armed group threatened to attack at night if the position was not vacated and then left. The same evening, UNDOF reinforced the United Nations position with an additional 40 personnel. All UNDOF personnel subsequently vacated the position, pushing through an attempted blockade by unidentified armed elements.

16. During the night of 15 May, a group of approximately 20 armed persons broke into the compound of United Nations observation post 52, which was manned by three Observer Group Golan military observers. Another 20 armed persons, initially

claiming to be Syrian Arab armed forces soldiers, forcibly took the three military observers to the village of Bir Ajam in the area of separation. In response to the incident, an UNDOF rapid response group from Camp Ziouani deployed to observation post 52. After about four hours, the military observers were released unharmed and returned to observation post 52. During the abduction of the peacekeepers, the armed group ransacked and looted the observation post, causing extensive damage to the facility and destroying electronic equipment.

17. In another incident involving United Nations personnel, on 19 April four UNDOF personnel travelling from Hadar to United Nations position 60 in a convoy of two vehicles were stopped by four unidentified, masked armed persons. Subsequently, the armed persons pointed their rifles at the peacekeepers and forced them to open the vehicle doors, which they had initially refused to do. One of the armed men fired two warning shots and forcibly took 1 rifle, 10 magazines and 300 rounds of ammunition from the United Nations vehicle. On 5 May, soldiers of the Syrian Arab armed forces pointed their weapons at UNDOF personnel travelling in clearly marked vehicles in the vicinity of Hanud.

18. UNDOF has protested the presence of Syrian Arab armed forces and equipment in the area of separation, the firing into and inside the area of separation, the firing at United Nations personnel and facilities and the abduction of United Nations personnel. The UNDOF Force Commander reiterated to Syrian authorities, including the Minister of Defence and the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, the obligation of the Syrian Arab armed forces to halt military operations in the area of separation and cease firing from the area of limitation, stressing the importance of abiding by the terms of the Disengagement Agreement and ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel on the ground. Senior United Nations officials have conveyed similar messages to the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations.

19. The Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed identical letters dated 5 May to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council claiming that Israeli aircraft had fired rockets from outside Syrian airspace at three sites belonging to the Syrian Arab armed forces in north-east Jamraya, Maysalun and the airport in the Dimas area, killing and wounding many Syrian civilians and causing widespread destruction (see S/2013/267). The Secretary-General issued a statement on the same day expressing grave concern about reports of Israeli air strikes in the Syrian Arab Republic, noting that the United Nations did not have the details of the reported incidents, nor was it in a position to verify independently what had occurred. On 8 May, the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic again addressed identical letters to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council claiming that Israel was providing support, including medical services, to "terrorists" on the Golan in violation of the Disengagement Agreement and the Charter of the United Nations (see S/2013/273). In recent weeks, Syrian officials have made public statements supporting action against Israel on the Golan.

20. Within this challenging operational environment, UNDOF supervised the area of separation by manning static positions to ensure that the military forces of both parties were excluded from it. UNDOF, through the Observer Group Golan, continued to carry out fortnightly inspections of equipment and force levels in the area of limitation on the Alpha side. Liaison officers from the Alpha side accompanied

Observer Group Golan inspection teams. On the Bravo side, Syrian authorities ceased the practice of providing liaison officers to accompany the Observer Group Golan inspection teams following the abduction on 30 July 2012, by unknown armed persons, of a Syrian liaison officer accompanying the military observers in the area of limitation. The deteriorating security situation on the Bravo side also resulted in the temporary suspension, since 5 March, of inspections and mobile operations in the area of limitation. As in the past, the Force faced restrictions on freedom of movement and its inspection teams were denied access to some positions on the Alpha side.

21. UNDOF continued to liaise closely with IDF and the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate to defuse tensions and keep channels of communication open in order to prevent an escalation of the situation across the ceasefire line. The UNDOF Force Commander also urged IDF to exercise maximum restraint, particularly with regard to incidents in proximity to the Alpha line.

22. UNDOF continued to adapt its operational posture to the ongoing IDF training activities and new military construction in the area of limitation on the Alpha side, Syrian civilian developments in proximity to the ceasefire line in the area of separation and increased military activities from the positions of the Syrian Arab armed forces along the Bravo line. IDF continued to enhance the technical fence and established additional physical obstacles along the technical fence to prevent crossings from the area of separation. Both sides maintained their defensive positions in the respective areas of limitation. Israeli customs officials continued to operate periodically at the IDF post at the UNDOF crossing gate between the Israeli-occupied Golan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

23. As at 21 May, UNDOF, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, has facilitated the crossing of 11,700 tons of apples from the Alpha side to the Bravo side. UNDOF continued to provide medical treatment to civilians, including emergency medical treatment, on a strictly humanitarian basis. During the intense fighting between the Syrian Arab armed forces and armed members of the opposition in the vicinity of Al Rafid in the area of separation in March, around 3,700 civilians from the villages of Al Rafid, Al Asbah and Al Aishah sought temporary shelter outside United Nations position 80. UNDOF provided drinking water and emergency medical treatment to several injured civilians. On 5 April, the civilians returned to their villages. On 7 May, around 800 civilians sought shelter once again outside the same position owing to clashes near Al Rafid village. The civilians moved away from the vicinity of position 80 on the same day.

24. In the area of operation, especially in the vicinity of the Alpha line in the area of separation, mines continued to pose a threat to UNDOF personnel and local inhabitants. Owing to the long-term presence of the mines and the deterioration of their detonation systems, the threat has increased. With enhanced mine clearing and detection capacity, UNDOF continued to carry out operational mine clearance.

25. Despite the limitations posed by the security situation on the Bravo side, UNDOF continued its efforts to liaise with local authorities and engage with the local population to explain the mission's mandate and activities. This was also important in the light of the security situation in the UNDOF area of operation, and as part of the effort to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel on the ground.

26. As at 25 May, UNDOF comprised 911 troops from Austria (377), the Philippines (341) and India (193). On 18 March, Croatia withdrew its contingent of 97 military personnel from UNDOF. The Government of Fiji agreed to contribute a contingent of 171 military personnel to replace the Croatian and Japanese contingents. From 14 to 21 May, a three-member team from Fiji visited UNDOF in preparation for the deployment of the contingent, scheduled for June. Further to the recommendations arising from the study of the military capability of UNDOF that was conducted in January 2013, the position of Deputy Force Commander was established in the mission. On 15 April, the new Deputy Force Commander, from Austria, assumed his position in UNDOF. On 6 June, the Government of Austria announced its decision to withdraw its contingent from UNDOF. The withdrawal of Austria, a long-standing troop-contributing country to UNDOF, will significantly affect the efforts of UNDOF to continue to implement its mandate. In this regard, the United Nations is approaching countries that are currently contributing troops to UNDOF and other Member States in an effort to identify urgently additional contributions from the former and new contributors to UNDOF among the latter. In addition, 80 military observers from UNTSO assisted the Force in carrying out its tasks.

27. Further to the request made by the Security Council in its resolution 2084 (2012), efforts continue to be made to ensure that the Force has the capacity necessary to fulfil its mandate in a safe and secure way. Most of the recommendations arising from the military capability study have been implemented. UNDOF continues to adopt and update mitigation measures in response to new threats in its operational environment. The mission maintained efforts to ensure the necessary strategic reserve and the Force's self-sustainment capability. In addition, UNDOF continued to implement the rehabilitation programme to maintain and upgrade its equipment and infrastructure, in an effort to maintain its operational and security capacity. Additional armoured vehicles were deployed to UNDOF with a view to enhancing force protection. All UNDOF personnel were equipped with personal protection kits and were provided with the appropriate training. The security situation made it necessary for UNDOF to consider, with the cooperation of relevant authorities, the use of alternative ports of entry and departure for mission personnel, including staff officers and contingent members.

28. Given the evolving security situation in the UNDOF area of operation, the mission continued to temporarily reconfigure its operations with a view to ensuring its continued ability to implement its mandate in a safe and secure manner. As such, UNDOF has continued to concentrate on static activities in an effort to reduce the exposure of personnel to danger, while focusing on enhancing situational analysis, reporting and liaising with the parties to prevent the situation from escalating. UNDOF mobile operations on the Bravo side remain temporarily suspended. These operational adjustments have involved a temporary shift in the focus of the activities of a number of Observer Group Golan military observers, from patrolling and inspection to static observation, liaison and situation analysis. In addition, military staff officers from the Secretariat were deployed temporarily to UNDOF for six weeks to fill capacity gaps within the UNDOF operations section. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is looking into ways of enhancing the self-defence capabilities of UNDOF, including by increasing the troop strength to about 1,250, within the parameters set forth in the Protocol to the Disengagement Agreement. The mission continues its efforts to ensure the necessary strategic reserve and the Force's self-sustainment capacity. In addition, UNDOF is putting in place risk

mitigation measures on the basis of a comprehensive risk assessment carried out by the mission with the support of the Secretariat. These measures include the reinforcement of observation posts manned by Observer Group Golan observers in isolated locations and regular rehearsals of evacuation operations. The mission reviews its contingency planning on an ongoing basis, taking into account the evolving situation in the area of operation.

29. Continuous efforts have been made to enhance the safety and security of United Nations personnel. Since 1 March, the UNDOF security section has been strengthened by an additional two security officers temporarily assigned to the mission. UNDOF has faced road closures and restrictions affecting movement in the area of operation and between the area of operation and Damascus on a recurring basis. A number of UNDOF national staff work from home as they are not able to report for work on a regular basis owing to the security situation and some administrative and security staff have been accommodated in converted offices in the representational office in Damascus. The offices of some international staff have been relocated from Camp Faouar to Camp Ziouani on the Alpha side.

III. Financial aspects

30. By its resolution 66/276, the General Assembly appropriated the amount of $46.0 million for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013. The financing arrangements for UNDOF for the same period and the related proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 are currently under consideration by the Assembly during the second part of its resumed sixty-seventh session. Should the Security Council approve the recommendation set out in paragraph 38 below with respect to the extension of the mandate of UNDOF, the cost for the maintenance of the Force during the extension period will be limited to resources approved by the Assembly.

31. As at 29 May 2013, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNDOF Special Account amounted to $18.5 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at the same date amounted to $1,381.4 million.

32. As at 29 May 2013, amounts owed to contributors for troop costs totalled $2.1 million. Reimbursements for troop costs and for equipment and self-sustainment have been made for the period up to 28 February 2013 and 31 December 2012, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

IV. Implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

33. The Security Council, when deciding in its resolution 2084 (2012) to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, until 30 June 2013, also called upon the parties concerned to immediately implement its resolution 338 (1973) and requested the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of the period, a report on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement that resolution. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, in particular the efforts undertaken at various levels to implement resolution 338 (1973), was dealt with in my report on the situation in the Middle East (A/67/342) submitted pursuant

to General Assembly resolutions 66/18, entitled "Jerusalem", and 66/19, entitled "The Syrian Golan".

34. Since the discontinuation of indirect peace talks in December 2008, there have been no negotiations between the parties, and the Syrian crisis currently impedes prospects of their resumption and progress towards peace between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. I look forward to a peaceful resolution of the crisis and the resumption of efforts towards a comprehensive, just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resoiution 338 (1973) and other relevant resolutions adopted by the Council.

V. Observations

35. I remain deeply concerned about the deteriorating security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, its impact on the Syrian population and its potential implications for the stability of the region. The situation has affected the UNDOF area of operation significantly. The ongoing military activities in the area of separation continue to have the potential to escalate tensions between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and to jeopardize the ceasefire between the two countries.

36. The developments in the UNDOF area of operation, including the intense clashes that occurred on 6 June in the area of separation, show the volatility of the situation on the Golan. I reiterate that all military activities in the area of separation conducted by any actor pose a risk to the long-held ceasefire and the local civilian population, as well as United Nations personnel on the ground. They undermine the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israeli and Syrian forces and the efforts of UNDOF to implement the mandate, and will continue to be reported as such. I call on all parties to the Syrian domestic conflict to cease military actions throughout the country, including in the UNDOF area of operation. There should be no military forces in the area of separation other than those of UNDOF.

37. The presence of the Syrian Arab armed forces and unauthorized military equipment in the area of separation is a grave violation of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement. The IDF retaliatory fire across the ceasefire line too is a serious violation of the Agreement. Any Israeli military action inside the Syrian Arab Republic puts the ceasefire at risk. I call upon Israel to exercise maximum restraint to prevent an escalation of the situation. The commitment to the Agreement must be upheld by both parties in order to maintain the calm and stability on the Golan. The threats of acting against Israel on the Golan made by Syrian leaders undermine the Agreement. In addition, I trust that both sides will take all necessary measures to protect civilians and ensure respect for the safety and security of UNDOF personnel, as well as freedom of movement for the Force throughout its area of operation. For its part, the United Nations will spare no effort in ensuring that the long-held ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic continues to hold.

38. I also remain deeply concerned by the incidents involving United Nations personnel on the ground. The mandate of UNDOF remains an important element in ensuring the stability of the region. It must be recalled that UNDOF was established by the Security Council with the agreement of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, and that its mandate was prescribed by the Disengagement Agreement and its Protocol. UNDOF is mandated to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian

Arab Republic, to see that it is scrupulously observed and to supervise the Agreement and the Protocol thereto with regard to the areas of separation and limitation.

39. Any hostile act against United Nations personnel on the ground, such as the recent abduction of four UNDOF personnel and three Observer Group Golan military observers, the direct and indirect firing at them by the Syrian Arab armed forces or armed members of the opposition, the theft of United Nations weapons and ammunition, vehicles and other assets, and the looting and destruction of United Nations facilities, are unacceptable. The safety and security of UNDOF personnel and Observer Group Golan military observers remains essential for enabling UNDOF to continue to implement its mandate under these difficult conditions.

40. The primary responsibility for the safety and security of United Nations personnel in the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side rests with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, and I again call on that Government to facilitate fully the efforts of the mission to continue implementing its mandate safely and securely. It is imperative that respect for the privileges and immunities of UNDOF and its freedom of movement be ensured. The ability of UNDOF to engage with the local population in its area of operation in order to inform the people of its mandate and activities is limited owing to the prevailing security situation. Armed members of the opposition operating in the UNDOF area of operation must be clearly apprised of the mandate of the mission and must immediately cease any actions that jeopardize the safety and security of United Nations personnel on the ground. It remains critical that countries with influence strongly convey to the armed opposition groups in the UNDOF area of operation the need to halt all activities that endanger United Nations peacekeepers on the ground and to accord United Nations personnel the freedom to carry out their mandate safely and securely.

41. It is equally critical that the Security Council continue to bring its influence to bear on the parties concerned to ensure that UNDOF is accorded the ability to operate freely and securely within its area of operation and to carry out its important mandate. It is essential that UNDOF continue to have at its disposal all the means and resources it needs to carry out its mandate safely and securely. It is vital that UNDOF retain the confidence and commitment of troop-contributing countries. The continued credible presence of UNDOF remains an important element in ensuring stability on the Golan and in the region. I regret the decision of the Government of Austria to withdraw from UNDOF, after what has been a long-standing and valuable contribution to the Force. Efforts are under way to identify urgently additional contributions and new contributors to UNDOF, in the light of the pending withdrawal of Austrian troops from UNDOF and to ensure that the withdrawal is conducted in an orderly fashion. I appeal to Member States to contribute troops to UNDOF to support United Nations efforts to enhance the capabilities of the Force.

42. Given the evolving security situation in the UNDOF area of operation, it is also necessary to consider further adjustments to the posture and operations of the mission, as well as additional mitigation measures. These include, as a matter of priority, enhancing the self-defence capabilities of UNDOF, including increasing the Force strength to about 1,250 and improving its self-defence equipment, within the parameters set forth in the Protocol to the Disengagement Agreement. In addition, UNDOF continuously reviews and updates its contingency plans. The support of the parties and the Security Council is critical as UNDOF continues to make these critical adjustments.

43. The current security situation has continued to disrupt UNDOF support and logistical activities on an almost daily basis, thus complicating significantly the ability of the mission to carry out its mandated tasks effectively. It is essential that the parties provide all the necessary support to ensure appropriate conditions for United Nations personnel on the ground and cooperate fully in facilitating the support and logistical activities of the mission.

44. Under the prevailing circumstances, I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 31 December 2013. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel too has expressed its agreement.

45. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to the Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Iqbal Singh Singha, and the military and civilian personnel serving under his leadership. These women and men continue to perform with efficiency and commitment and under challenging circumstances the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council. I have full confidence that UNDOF will continue to make its best effort to carry out its mission. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops to UNDOF and to those providing the UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force.

S/2013/346

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United Nations S/2013/346

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 June 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 10 June 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I wish to draw your attention to Security Council resolution 833 (1993), in which the Council welcomed the decision of the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the maintenance of the physical representation of the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait until other technical arrangements are established by Iraq and Kuwait for this purpose, as recommended by the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission in section X.C of its report (S/25811 and Add.1). The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) made the necessary arrangements in the former demilitarized zone until its withdrawal in March 2003.

Following an enquiry from the Government of Kuwait, the Secretary-General wrote to the Governments of Kuwait and Iraq on 13 and 15 April 2005, respectively, to inform them that, owing to the departure of UNIKOM and for security reasons, the United Nations had been unable to inspect or maintain the physical representation of the boundary since March 2003. He also reiterated his full commitment to continuing to discharge his responsibility pursuant to Security Council resolution 833 (1993). A field assessment mission, bringing together representatives of the United Nations and both Governments, was deployed to the border form 11 to 25 February 2006, as part of the preparatory work of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Maintenance Project. Subsequent attempts by the United Nations to make the necessary arrangements proved unsuccessful, owing to late and incomplete contributions to the Project Trust Fund, as well as the non-removal of obstacles obstructing the line of sight between boundary pillars, which was one of the recommendations of the field assessment mission.

The United Nations continued to pursue the matter, but had to deactivate the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Maintenance Project in 2009 owing to lack of progress. On 20 March 2012, following a visit to Kuwait by the Prime Minister of Iraq, the Government of Iraq paid its outstanding contribution of $600,000 to the Trust Fund. On 29 April 2012, the Iraq-Kuwait Joint Ministerial Committee requested that the maintenance of the physical representation of the boundary be resumed by the end of October 2012.

On 4 May 2012, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs agreed to the request of the permanent representatives of Iraq and Kuwait to the United Nations that the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Maintenance Project be reactivated. From 4 to 11 June 2012, a second field assessment mission, bringing together representatives of the United Nations and both Governments, was deployed to the

border to update the concept of operations and the scope of field maintenance work. Following the selection of companies for engineering and surveying services and the deployment of Iraqi and Kuwaiti technical observers, field maintenance work, under the supervision of United Nations technical staff, started on 15 January 2013.

According to the scope of work, field maintenance work consisted of restoring all boundary pillars and sub-pillars, witness markers, survey plaques and country name plates to their original status and installing additional pillars if necessary. The work was completed on 28 March 2013 (see annex I, tables listing engineering and surveying services provided), by which date the Governments of Kuwait and Iraq had removed all the obstacles between boundary pillars. The United Nations is finalizing the sets of maps of the border area, which will be handed over to the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait along with all relevant technical data and information.

In line with the relevant provision of Security Council resolution 833 (1993), on 30 May 2013, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Iraq and Kuwait informed me that, on 28 May 2013, their Governments had signed a memorandum of understanding establishing a bilateral technical arrangement for the physical representation of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait (see annexes II and III).

In the light of the completion of the maintenance of the physical representation of the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, and the establishment of a bilateral technical arrangement for that purpose, it will no longer be required that I make the necessary arrangements. I would therefore consider that my responsibilities under Security Council resolution 833 (1993) have been discharged. In line with relevant United Nations financial rules and regulations, residual funds, if any, less applicable administrative costs, will be returned from the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Maintenance Project Trust Fund to the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and the annexes thereto to the attention of the members of the Security Council for their information and any action deemed appropriate.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

Annex I

Survey and engineering services provided during Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Maintenance Project field work

Pillars and sub-pillars	*Survey services*	*Pillar number*	*Total*
Intermediate pillars	Installed and surveyed at existing sites	48A, 60A, 72A, 81A, 82A, 84A, 85A, 105B, 105D	9
	Installed and surveyed at new sites	10A-15A, 46A, 47A, 51A, 53A, 55A, 93A, 95A, 98A, 102A	15
Witness markers	Installed and surveyed at existing intermediate pillars sites	48A, 49A, 60A, 64A, 66A, 73A, 76A, 78A, 96A, 104A, 105A, 105B, 105C, 105D	14
	Installed and surveyed at new intermediate pillars sites	10A-15A, 46A, 47A, 51A, 53A, 55A, 93A, 95A, 98A, 102A	15
	Installed and surveyed at existing main pillars sites	3, 6, 9, 54, 55, 72, 76, 80, 82, 85, 86, 89, 90, 91(2), 103, 104	17
Main pillars	Installed and surveyed	27, 63, 68	3
	Surveyed		106
Pointer pillars	Installed and surveyed	11, 12, 14, 16, 20, 31, 32, 45, 58, 61, 76(2), 89(2), 105(2), 106(2)	18
	Surveyed		152

	Quantity		
Engineering services	*New*	*Replaced*	*Total*
Pillars and witness markers			
Main pillars		3	3
Intermediate pillars	15	9	24
Witness markers	15	31	46
Pointer pillars		18	18
Survey plaques replaced/installed			
Main pillars	3	74	77
Intermediate pillars	24		24
Witness markers	15	31	46
Pointer pillars		160	160
Country name plates replaced			
Iraq country name plate		106	106
Kuwait country name plate		106	106

Engineering services	*Quantity*		
	New	*Replaced*	*Total*
Repaired	*Major*	*Minor*	*Total*
Main pillars	3	21	24
Pointer pillars		3	3

Action/date	*15/10/2012 — 16/12/2013*	*17/12/2012 — 14/01/2013*	*15/01/2013 — 28/01/2013*	*29/01/2013 — 02/03/2013*	*03/03/2013 — 28/03/2013*
Deployment and preparation					
Prefabrications and organization					
Stage I (assessment and minor repairs)					
Stage II (installation of pillars and GPS site survey)					
Stage III (as-built survey and painting)					

Annex II

Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

I refer to your letter of 8 April 2013 to Mr. Nuri Kamel al-Maliki, Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq, in which you state that the United Nations looks forward to the establishment of bilateral arrangements between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti sides to follow up maintenance of the physical representation of the boundary in the future. Further to your letter, we have now concluded a memorandum of understanding with the State of Kuwait for the maintenance of the boundary pillars on a bilateral basis.

I commend your intensive efforts to take effective steps to implement the Security Council resolutions concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. I am also pleased to congratulate the United Nations team responsible for maintaining the boundary markers on its considerable efforts and on the tangible achievement of completing that project within the time frame agreed by the two countries. We have cooperated in a genuine and effective manner with your mission and with the Kuwaiti team to remove all of the boundary encroachments that impeded the maintenance of the markers.

We welcome the completion of work to establish the physical representation of the boundaries referred to in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in accordance with paragraph 105 of the letter of the Secretary-General contained in document S/25811 of 21 May 1993, which was endorsed by Security Council resolution 833 (1993).

We also wish to inform you that we have concluded an agreement with your Special Representative at the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) concerning the receipt of compensation due to Iraqi farmers in accordance with Security Council resolution 899 (1994). We shall distribute those amounts to the beneficiaries, in addition to amounts allocated for that purpose by the Iraqi Government.

Lastly, we should like to express our appreciation for your efforts to support and assist Iraq in completing the fulfilment of its outstanding obligations as set forth in the Security Council resolutions concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. We hope that the foregoing will be reflected in your next report to the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Hoshyar **Zebari**
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq

Annex III

Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

I write with reference to your letter of 8 April 2013 to His Highness Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Amir of the State of Kuwait. In the letter, you state that the United Nations looks forward to the establishment of bilateral arrangements between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq to follow up maintenance of the physical representation of the boundary in the future.

I commend the intensive efforts of the Security Council to follow up implementation of its resolutions concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. I am also pleased to congratulate the United Nations team responsible for maintaining the boundary markers on its considerable efforts and on the tangible achievement of completing that project within the time frame agreed by the two countries. I appreciate the genuine and effective cooperation of the Iraqi side in removing all of the boundary encroachments that impeded the maintenance of the markers.

We welcome the completion of work to establish the physical representation of the boundaries in accordance with paragraph 105 of the letter of the Secretary-General contained in document S/25811 of 21 May 1993, which was endorsed by Security Council resolution 833 (1993). At the same time, we wish to emphasize the contents of paragraph 6 of that resolution, in which the Council

> *underlines and reaffirms* its decision to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary which has now been finally demarcated by the Commission and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter, as provided for in paragraph 4 of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 4 of resolution 773 (1992).

We commend the Government of Iraq on concluding an agreement with the United Nations for the receipt of compensation payments due to Iraqi farmers in accordance with resolution 899 (1994).

I am pleased to inform you that a memorandum of understanding was signed on 28 May 2013 establishing a bilateral Iraqi-Kuwaiti technical commission responsible for arrangements for maintaining the physical representation of the boundary between the two countries. That measure fulfils the provisions of preambular paragraph 7 of resolution 833 (1993), which envisages the establishment of technical arrangements to maintain the physical representation of the boundary.

Lastly, we reiterate that the State of Kuwait is committed and fully prepared to provide Iraq with the support that it needs in order to fulfil of all of its outstanding obligations under the Security Council resolutions concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait.

(*Signed*) Sabah Khalid Al Hamad **Al Sabah**
Deputy Prime Minister
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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United Nations S/2013/347

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 June 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 12 June 2013 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 10 June 2013 (S/2013/346) concerning the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Maintenance Project Trust Fund has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Mark **Lyall Grant**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations A/67/893–S/2013/348

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
17 June 2013
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Item 105
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 13 June 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to draw your attention to the following information:

On Wednesday, 12 June 2013, in continuation of the slaughter of innocent civilians by armed terrorist groups, the Al-Nusrah Front added yet more carnage to its record when it committed a fresh massacre in the village of Hatla, which is located in the Dayr al-Zawr countryside, killing dozens of civilians, the majority of whom were women and children. The victims were killed for their refusal to support the terrorists in committing criminal acts against innocent civilians. The terrorists also vandalized and looted civilians' property and burned their homes, and they attacked, desecrated and looted houses of worship. Social networking sites posted video clips that prove the Al-Nusrah Front perpetrated this massacre, the commission of which was encouraged by Shafi al-Ajami, a *salafist*, *takfirist* religious leader in Kuwait, who has dispatched and funded thousands of jihadist terrorists to support the Al-Nusrah Front and other armed terrorist groups in Syria. The media have broadcast his statements in which he agitates for strife, hatred and killing in Syria.

In a series of letters addressed to you, the Syrian Arab Republic has assiduously sought to draw your attention the danger posed by the spread of extremism and terrorism, and has documented the crimes committed by the armed groups. The Syrian Arab Republic stresses that the refusal of certain countries to allow the Security Council to condemn the many terrorist crimes that have been committed in Syria has encouraged the armed terrorist groups to continue committing crimes against innocent civilians, including the perpetration of massacres, the indiscriminate firing of mortar shells at civilian areas and suicide bombings. The terrorists have also targeted residential buildings, the State's service, teaching and educational institutions, hospitals and Muslim and Christian houses of worship, and they have assassinated and abducted Muslim and Christian religious

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leaders, ransacked and destroyed ancient monuments and museums, vandalized tombs and abducted peacekeepers of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. Such actions are in keeping with the terroristic, *salafist* method that Al-Qaida has diligently pursued.

Certain States of the region and from outside it, the foremost of which are Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, are continuing to directly and openly support terrorism in Syria by providing funding, arms, training and safe havens for the armed terrorist groups. Those actions, as well as the recent European decision to end the prohibition on arming the "opposition" that was adopted under pressure from Britain and France, are a grave violation of the legal obligations arising from Security Council resolutions and international instruments concerning counter-terrorism. The European Union decision to authorize the purchase of Syrian oil, which the armed terrorist groups steal and then sell in order to buy arms and military equipment, is yet another violation of the European States' commitment to suppress the financing of terrorism and contrary to all relevant international resolutions, foremost of which is Security Council resolution 1373 (2001).

The Syrian Arab Republic once again warns of the dangers of supporting the *takfirist* terrorism espoused by Al-Qaida and executed by the Al-Nusrah Front and its allies the Islamic Brigades and the so-called Free Syrian Army, many units of which have declared their loyalty to the Al-Nusrah Front. It also warns of the dangers of ignoring such terrorism. Syria emphasizes that the continued provision by certain States of arms to the "opposition", or the declaration of a readiness to do so, under the pretext of changing the military balance on the ground, not only constitutes support for terrorism and terrorists, but also lays bare the intention of those States to hinder Syrians from arriving at a political solution under Syrian leadership and in a manner that respects the will and choices of the Syrian people.

By putting these facts before the Security Council, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic is calling on the Council to shoulder its responsibilities under its own resolutions concerning counter-terrorism and to condemn the massacre that occurred Hatla in the Dayr al-Zawr countryside. The Council should also prevail upon those States that are supporting terrorism in Syria to desist from their practices, which are threatening security and stability in Syria and the region.

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 105, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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United Nations S/2013/349

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 June 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 12 June 2013 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 5 March 2013 from the President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judge Theodor Meron, in which he seeks the support of the members of the Security Council in facilitating the completion of the Tribunal's work through the appointment of an additional judge to be deployed to the Appeals Chamber.

The members of the Security Council note that the Tribunal has less than the maximum number of 16 permanent judges permitted under article 12, paragraph 1, of its statute. The members of the Council have carefully analysed the current situation in the Tribunal based on the Completion Strategy Report of the Tribunal (S/2013/308) and the April 2013 consolidated comprehensive plan and the updated and detailed schedules for each of the individual cases which the Tribunal presented to the Council pursuant to its resolution 2081 (2012). The members of the Council reasonably expect that an additional permanent judge would assist in the effective and timely completion of the Tribunal's mandate in accordance with resolution 1966 (2010).

Therefore, I am pleased to inform you that the members of the Security Council have decided that one permanent judge of the Tribunal should be elected under article 13 bis, paragraph 1, of the statute, to be immediately assigned and redeployed to the Appeals Chamber.

In this regard, the members of the Security Council request you to invite States to submit nominations within a period of 30 days. From the nominations received, the Council will establish a list of three candidates, or, should there be only two nominations, a list of two candidates, taking into account the adequate representation of the principal legal systems of the world and the nationalities of the current permanent judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The term of office of the judge elected will be the same as the term of office of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia judges currently serving in the Appeals Chamber.

(*Signed*) Mark **Lyall Grant**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations A/67/889–S/2013/350

General Assembly
Security Council

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13 June 2013

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General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 38
The situation in Afghanistan

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 67/16 and Security Council resolution 2096 (2013), in which the Council requested me to report on developments in Afghanistan every three months.

2. The report provides an update on the activities of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including significant humanitarian, development and human rights efforts, since my previous report, issued on 5 March 2013 (A/67/778-S/2013/133). It also provides a summary of key political and security developments and regional and international events relating to Afghanistan.

II. Relevant developments

A. Political developments

3. The reporting period saw increased political activity among Afghan stakeholders ahead of the country's political and security transitions, which culminate in 2014. Politically, the focus has become fixed on the presidential and provincial council elections in 2014. In building a credible electoral framework for this landmark poll, the appointment of the Chair of the Independent Election Commission will be among the most important decisions. With the term of the incumbent Chair expiring on 17 April, President Hamid Karzai convened a consultative meeting with political, jihadi and civil society representatives and religious leaders, on 9 April, to address this and other election-related issues. A number of groups, including the 23-member Cooperation Council of Political Parties and Coalitions of Afghanistan, boycotted the gathering and argued that a decision on Commission membership should be made through institutional channels

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once the Law on the Structure and Duties of the Independent Election Commission and the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (the "structure law") had been finalized. After the meeting, it was announced that the selection of the Chair would be postponed until both the structure law and the electoral law were passed.

4. The National Assembly continued to debate these two key pieces of legislation. On 13 April, a joint commission of the upper and lower houses resolved an impasse over the structure law, removing a controversial provision for the inclusion of two international members on the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission, and sent the law for signature to the President. On 29 April, the bill was returned to the lower house, or Wolesi Jirga. Eight objections were formulated, including arguments that provisions for a permanent Independent Electoral Complaints Commission and an appointment process for the Independent Election Commission, by which the President would choose from a shortlist prepared by the legislature and civil society, were unconstitutional. On 22 May, the electoral law was passed by the Wolesi Jirga, whose members backed the retention of a single, non-transferable voting system and the continuation of a 10-seat quota for the nomadic Kuchi population, to be apportioned among 10 provinces. The bill was then forwarded to the upper house, or Meshrano Jirga.

5. Political parties and personalities continued to explore potential alliances and platforms. Leading figures of the Jamiat-e Islami party have demonstrated increasing autonomy, with some joining the two major opposition blocs (the National Coalition of Afghanistan and the National Front of Afghanistan), both led by Jamiat figures, while others hold government posts. Junbish-e Milli focused on revitalizing and broadening its political base ahead of its planned congress. On 11 April, a representative of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's armed opposition group, Hezb-e Islami, stated that a delegation had met in Kabul with the registered Hezb-e Islami (Afghanistan) political party and discussed potential participation in the 2014 polls. The Cooperation Council of Political Parties and Coalitions of Afghanistan, despite having a diverse membership that includes both major opposition coalitions, Junbish-e Milli, Hezb-e Islami (Afghanistan) and some government figures, continued to show unity in pressing for timely and credible elections. A new formation, the National Cooperation Council of Afghanistan, involving many of the same members as the Cooperation Council, has also emerged with a more specific focus on agreeing on a platform to contest the polls.

6. Technical preparations for the elections continued and, on 6 April, the Independent Election Commission issued a draft operational plan and indicative budget. The latter put operational costs for the 2014 elections at $129 million. To foster common understanding on funding means and modalities for the elections, which are almost entirely financed by the international community, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) facilitated a series of meetings between the Commission, the Ministry of Finance, international donors and United Nations partners. The goal was to increase on-budget electoral financing while respecting the operational and political independence of the Commission and satisfying donor requirements. Discussions with donors are also under way to revise the United Nations electoral support project, ELECT II (Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow, second phase), and to shift its focus from capacity-building to assistance for the upcoming electoral cycle.

7. On 24 March, the Ministry of the Interior launched the national electronic identification card project (known as "e-taskera") in Kabul Province, which, among a broad range of other functions, is intended to serve as the foundation for voter identification in the medium to long term. The Government has estimated that the initial enrolment process will cost $120 million for an estimated population of 30 million. The Ministry of Finance has allocated approximately $4 million in the current financial year for the roll-out and has requested additional international financial support. UNAMA facilitated discussions involving relevant ministries, the Independent Election Commission and potential donors on appropriate funding modalities. On 18 April, the Ministry of the Interior announced that it would postpone the issuance of cards until the Law on Registration and Population Records had been passed.

8. On 26 May, the Independent Election Commission launched its voter registration top-up exercise, following a one-month delay to strengthen operational planning and ensure greater coordination with the roll-out of the e-taskera project. The top-up exercise involves providing voter registration cards to those newly eligible, those who have lost or damaged cards and those who have moved to a new location or returned to Afghanistan. The exercise, which was first carried out in the 34 provinces, will be expanded to the district level and include a final pre-polling day effort where necessary.

9. The peace process saw few concrete developments. The establishment of an office in Doha for authorized representatives of the Taliban continued to be delayed. On 30 and 31 March, President Karzai visited Qatar at the invitation of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, where bilateral cooperation, including on the proposed office, and investment by Qatar in Afghanistan were discussed. Meanwhile, the High Peace Council of Afghanistan focused on public outreach, including an information-sharing meeting on 16 April with representatives of political parties and civil society, together with UNAMA.

10. In April and May, the Mission organized a second round of provincial workshops on mediation and conflict resolution. Influential community actors in Jalalabad, Kunduz, Gardez and the central region worked to foster a shared understanding of non-violent alternatives, including local, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. Separately, UNAMA continued to support the second phase of the Afghan People's Dialogue on Peace, a civil society initiative. In May, over 70 focus group discussions involving more than 1,200 individuals were held. The participants in the discussions — community and religious leaders, women and youth representatives, former armed opposition members and beneficiaries of development projects — indicated that impunity, human rights abuses and corruption were underlying factors fuelling local violence.

11. The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme reported that, as at 22 May, 6,840 former insurgents had joined the Programme, which had 331 community projects and 146 small grants either completed or in progress. A midterm evaluation of the five-year United Nations-supported Programme was released in March. Among the challenges identified were over-centralized structures and issues of oversight, especially in insecure areas. Recommendations focused on consolidating the reintegration process and extending transition assistance for former insurgents from three to six months.

12. On 16 April, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) approved the listing of an individual for manufacturing improvised explosive devices for the Taliban and for constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan. This listing reflected an increased focus by the Committee on those who cause casualties and fund the insurgency.

13. On 26 April, a general cooperation agreement was signed between Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia enhancing bilateral ties and, in particular, focusing on facilities and opportunities for investment. On 29 April and 2 May, President Karzai signed bilateral long-term partnership agreements with Finland and Denmark, respectively. Finland will focus on education and on assisting in the training and equipping of Afghan security forces, while Denmark will focus on civil society and police development.

B. Security developments

14. As at 28 May, the United Nations-administered Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan was supporting 140,881 Afghan National Police personnel, against a target strength of 157,000 personnel, of whom 1,929 were women. As at 1 May, the Trust Fund was supporting about 177,000 Afghan National Army personnel (the goal is to support 187,000 personnel) and 6,900 Afghan Air Force personnel (8,000 is the target). On 11 April, the Minister of the Interior signed a 10-year vision document aimed at transforming the police from an auxiliary security force to a service focused on law enforcement. The document recognizes that the function of the police is distinct from that of the military and the central importance of human security to stability and development efforts. Attrition of personnel and coordination between security institutions remained areas of significant challenges. As the responsibility for security continues to be transferred, Afghan forces will increasingly bear the cost of operations and casualties. While lower than in the previous reporting period, the number of insider attacks against international military personnel continued to take a toll. Afghan personnel attacked or facilitated insurgent actions against their own forces in Badghis Province on 21 March, in Ghazni Province on 19 April and in Uruzgan Province on 13 May. The Afghan Local Police programme, a separate local defence initiative with 21,600 personnel as at 23 April, has contributed to increased stability and public confidence in a growing number of areas despite being a particular focus of insurgent attacks. Weaknesses in vetting, command and control and oversight of this force remain issues of concern. On 19 April, 12 Afghan Local Police members were killed by insurgents in Ghazni Province.

15. On 14 May, the group known as the "Kabul friends of Chicago" met in Berlin, on the margins of an international contact group meeting, to consider progress in establishing a funding framework to deliver international pledges to sustain Afghan security forces. Given the donor requirements, including a clear distinction in financing police and military activities, it was proposed to maintain four separate funding streams (one through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan for the police and three — one through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), one through non-NATO bilateral partners and one through the United States of America — for the army) and to create a new oversight and coordination body that would be chaired jointly by Afghanistan and donors to ensure coherence.

16. The United Nations continued to monitor security-related events relevant to the work, mobility and safety of civilian actors, in particular those incidents that affect the implementation of United Nations activities. From 16 February to 15 May, 4,267 incidents were recorded, representing a 10 per cent increase compared with the same period in 2012, with over 70 per cent of events recorded in the southern, south-eastern and eastern parts of the country. An 18 per cent year-on-year increase in incidents was recorded in the eastern region, with a reported influx of insurgents into Nuristan and Badakhshan Provinces, indicating a shift in the strategic focus in the conflict. Armed clashes and improvised explosive devices continued to constitute the majority of attacks. Some devices found in the southern, eastern and central areas were more sophisticated than similar devices found previously. Industrial-grade material holds the potential for greater mass casualty events, and its volume and steady appearance pointed to the existence of stable transnational supply chains.

17. Armed clashes in March and April in Wardoj district, Badakhshan Province, where Afghanistan took the security lead in September 2012, underlined challenges faced by the security forces and the complex and evolving nature of the security situation. Owing to its proximity to strategic drug trafficking and insurgent routes, the area has become a locus of criminal and insurgent activity. Following an ambush on 2 March in which 17 Afghan National Army personnel were killed, the National Security Council ordered Afghan forces to secure the area. On 27 March, after initial challenges relating to coordination and strong resistance from anti-Government elements, advisory elements of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) returned to Badakhshan Province to support Afghan forces. While some extremist foreign elements linked to Al-Qaida appear to have been involved, the fighters were largely drawn from the local Tajik population, in contrast to the predominantly Pashtun ranks of the Taliban. The extent to which the violence is a result of local rivalries and alliances of convenience rather than a manifestation of a deeper radicalization and support for insurgent aims, is unclear. Sporadic clashes continue.

18. In central Wardak Province, United States special operations forces left Nirkh and Chak districts on 30 March and 14 April, respectively, in line with an Afghan National Security Council decision taken in February demanding their early withdrawal following allegations of abuse by international forces and their Afghan affiliates. Wardak Province has served as the location of a pilot for several local security initiatives since 2006, and has witnessed a proliferation of official and unofficial armed groups. On 16 March, several hundred people marched on the National Assembly in Kabul to support early withdrawal following demonstrations in the provincial capital. A number of Afghan security officials have, however, expressed concern about the potential impact on security in this strategic province bordering Kabul. To date, no major deterioration in security has been noted in Wardak Province.

19. On 27 April, the Taliban announced its spring offensive, named "Khalid ibn al-Walid", and stated its intention to direct complex suicide and insider attacks against "the bases of foreign invaders, their diplomatic centres and military airbases". In reality, international military forces constituted around 4 per cent of targets between mid-February and mid-May. Major incidents included a blast on 9 March near the Ministry of Defence in Kabul, which killed nine civilians. On 26 March, suicide attackers targeted the police headquarters in Jalalabad, killing

five police personnel. A complex assault on the judicial institutions of Farah Province on 3 April resulted in dozens of predominantly civilian casualties. On 29 May, a suicide attack in Panjshir Province targeted the Governor's office — a rare strike in the heartland of the former Northern Alliance. Hezb-e Islami (Gulbuddin) claimed responsibility for the 16 May suicide blast in Kabul that killed nine Afghan civilians, two ISAF personnel and four contractors. On 11 June, a suicide attack on the Supreme Court, timed and located in a public place where government employees were finishing work for the day, killed at least 17 civilians and wounded some 40 others. Successful interdiction efforts included the discovery by the Afghan security forces of a major arms cache and five arrests in Kabul on 13 March.

20. The United Nations, its implementing partners and other humanitarian entities faced a variety of threats. On 15 April, small arms fire struck a United Nations helicopter flying over Ghazni Province. Although the incident did not result in casualties, further air safety measures have been adopted. On 24 May, the Taliban claimed responsibility for a complex assault on a compound of the International Organization for Migration in central Kabul. In its statement, the Taliban wrongly alleged that the compound was a site for foreign military intelligence personnel. Three civilians were killed and 23 injured; one police officer was killed and another five wounded; and four United Nations staff and four security personnel were injured. Afghan security forces demonstrated competence and bravery in fending off the assault. On 29 May, premises of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Jalalabad were subjected to a suicide attack; one civilian was killed and two were injured.

C. Regional cooperation

21. Tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan increased. On 25 March, shelling reportedly from Pakistan landed in Dangam district in Kunar Province, Afghanistan. While no casualties were reported, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan expressed grave concern to the Ambassador of Pakistan to Afghanistan. The Government of Pakistan dismissed the Afghan claims that artillery shells had been fired by the Pakistani army. On 1 April, the Government of Afghanistan again expressed concern over what it said were Islamabad's unilateral checkpoint construction activities in Goshta district, Nangarhar Province. This and other disputes led to a number of armed clashes, with ensuing casualties, followed by public protests in various parts of Afghanistan. On 15 April, Pakistan declared that the dispute over the construction of a checkpoint at the Torkham crossing had been resolved between senior Afghan and Pakistani military commanders.

22. On 24 April, President Karzai, Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan General Ashfaq Kayani and United States Secretary of State John Kerry addressed tensions in relations at a trilateral meeting in Brussels. On 12 May, following elections in Pakistan, the leader of the majority party in the National Assembly, Mian Nawaz Sharif, stated that his country needed to improve ties with Afghanistan and confirmed the readiness of Pakistan to cooperate with Afghanistan in counter-terrorism efforts. In a message of congratulations, President Karzai expressed the hope that the bilateral relationship would strengthen further and, in particular, that there would be serious cooperation from Pakistan in the fight against terrorism.

23. Throughout the wider region, discussions are increasingly being held on the challenges to and opportunities for stability presented by the transition in Afghanistan and on the mutual benefits of cooperation. On 20 March, in Ashgabat, the Presidents of Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan signed a memorandum of understanding on the establishment of railroads linking the three countries. On 29 March, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan attended the eleventh ministerial meeting of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, held in Dushanbe, at which he endorsed the concept of the Dialogue in enhancing regional connectivity to promote trade, investment, transit and people-to-people contacts. At a trilateral meeting held in Beijing on 3 April, the Russian Federation, China and Pakistan agreed to make concerted efforts to safeguard peace, stability and security in Afghanistan and the region, support the Afghan-led reconciliation process and strengthen cooperation against terrorism and for drug control within the framework of the Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization too was expected to play a greater role in support of Afghanistan. From 19 to 23 May, the Premier of the State Council of China made State visits to India and Pakistan. Joint statements were made recognizing the importance of Afghanistan for regional stability and to back an Afghan-led reconciliation process. From 20 to 22 May, President Karzai visited India, where he paid tribute to Indian development assistance, in particular in the field of education. On 21 and 22 May, my Special Representative for Afghanistan, Ján Kubiš, visited Tehran, where he met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other officials. He was assured of the continued support of the Islamic Republic of Iran for Afghanistan throughout the transition.

24. On 26 April, in Almaty, participants in the third ministerial conference on the Istanbul Process adopted implementation plans for the six priority confidence-building measures endorsed in June 2012. In the declaration adopted at the conference, participants stressed the political nature of the process but also emphasized the need for demonstrable progress in agreed activities and called for interim, ad hoc funding by participants.

III. Human rights

25. Between 1 February and 30 April, UNAMA documented 533 civilian deaths and 882 civilian injuries, a 25 per cent increase compared with the same period in 2012. Civilian deaths increased by 44 per cent and civilian injuries by 16 per cent. Anti-Government elements were responsible for 73 per cent of the civilians killed and wounded in this period and pro-Government forces for 12 per cent. Insurgent use of improvised explosive devices, complex attacks and suicide bombs accounted for 51 per cent of all civilian casualties. Ground engagements attributed to all parties resulted in 83 civilian deaths and 224 injuries, an increase of 35 per cent from 2012. Ground engagements accounted for 21 per cent of all civilian casualties.

26. The country task force on monitoring and reporting on children and armed conflict led by the United Nations received and verified a total of 129 incidents resulting in 99 deaths and 196 injuries of children between 1 February and 30 April. Improvised explosive devices, explosive remnants of war, crossfire and suicide attacks were the main causes. A total of 25 incidents involving actions against educational premises and staff, including the burning of schools, targeted killings and abductions, were reported; 9 were verified. Armed opposition groups were

reported to have recruited 29 boys to carry out conflict-related activities such as assembling and planting explosives and taking part in combat operations. Afghan security forces were reported to have recruited three boys for police operations. The country task force compiled a response to the progress report of the Government on implementing the action plan for the prevention of underage recruitment.

27. The targeted killing of civilians deemed to be supporting the authorities resulted in 158 civilian deaths between 1 February and 30 April — an increase of 88 per cent compared with 2012. Incidents included the beheading by anti-Government elements of three civilians from Ghorak district, Kandahar Province, on 18 March, allegedly for working with the Government. On 21 March, a remote-controlled improvised explosive device killed a district governor and two tribal elders in Takhar Province; the Taliban claimed responsibility. On 5 April, the Taliban also claimed responsibility for the attack on judicial institutions in Farah Province, which killed 33 civilians and injured 105 more, and threatened to target court workers further. The attack had an immediate, negative impact on the delivery of justice in a province where judges and prosecutors were already largely absent at the district level owing to security threats. On 19 April, anti-Government elements amputated a hand and a foot each of two private security guards employed by the international military in Herat. On 23 April, a district prosecutor in Faryab Province was ambushed in his vehicle and killed with five other civilians. On 20 May, the chair of the Baghlan Provincial Council — a major Jamiat figure — was killed by a suicide blast with another 13 civilians.

28. Operations by pro-Government forces resulted in the deaths of 76 civilians and 91 injuries between 1 February and 30 April. The majority resulted from aerial operations, which killed 34 civilians and injured 35. Ground engagements by pro-Government forces killed 12 civilians and injured 36. On 6 April, in Kunar Province, 13 civilians, including 11 children, died and 6 others were wounded in an airstrike. Further inquiry suggested that the casualties probably resulted from blast waves caused by the excessive use of air-delivered munitions. International forces had conducted aerial operations against anti-Government elements in the same district on 13 February, in which five children and four women were killed.

29. On 25 March, the Afghan authorities assumed control of the detention facility in Parwan (widely known as Bagram prison). The understanding is that detainees deemed dangerous are subject to some form of administrative detention and that they will not be released by Afghan authorities. On 3 April, the Minister of the Interior requested UNAMA to be international co-Chair of a subworking group on prisons to advise and provide guidance on implementing the Ministry's new 10-year vision. The initial focus is on a two-year plan for the Central Prison Directorate.

30. UNAMA also engaged with the Government and donors in advocating the implementation of Presidential Decree No. 129, by which key institutions, in particular the National Directorate of Security, the Attorney General's Office, the Supreme Court and the ministries of justice, the interior and public health are to prosecute alleged perpetrators of torture, release detainees being held arbitrarily and improve access to defence lawyers and medical treatment. A joint delegation of the Ministry of the Interior and the Supreme Court undertook an extensive review of detainee cases as part of this effort. Following visits to eight provinces, the delegation ordered the release of more than 300 prisoners whom it had found to have been detained illegally.

31. On 18 May, the Wolesi Jirga opened a debate on the Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women. Promulgated as a presidential decree in 2009, it remains a landmark achievement in ensuring and expanding the protection of women. Despite disagreement between women's rights activists and the head of the Wolesi Jirga's Commission on Human Rights, Women and Civil Society, draft amendments were put forward in an attempt to secure parliamentary approval and strengthen some provisions. Upon introduction to the plenary, heated debate ensued, with conservative lawmakers attacking key provisions, including shelters for women victims of violence and a minimum marriage age. The bill was referred back to the house's technical commissions for further consideration. Full implementation of the law is a key government commitment under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework.

IV. Implementation of the Kabul process, development coordination and the rule of law

32. On 10 April, President Karzai endorsed 24 tangible actions (17 for the Government and 7 for the international community) drawn from core elements of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. These "hard" deliverables aimed to track the implementation of commitments prior to the meeting of senior officials, to be held on 3 July, to review progress a year after the Framework was adopted. Most critical to the Government are international pledges to provide over $16 billion to Afghanistan until 2015, with 50 per cent of the assistance routed through the national budget and 80 per cent aligned with national priority programmes. Donors emphasize the need for the Government to commit to a credible, inclusive and robust electoral architecture; implementation of the Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women; enforcement of anti-corruption measures; provincial budgeting processes; and a robust legal framework to encourage investment in the extractive industries. In preparing for the one-day meeting, it is expected that discussions will be held on the following themes: representational democracy and elections; aid effectiveness; governance, the rule of law and human rights; the integrity of public finance and commercial banking practices; government revenues, budget execution and subnational governance; and inclusive and sustained growth. The ministries of finance and for foreign affairs will co-chair the meeting together with my Special Representative for Afghanistan. UNAMA has acted as secretariat and facilitator of a task force between international stakeholders and the Ministry of Finance in preparing for the gathering.

33. Implementation of the 20 national priority programmes that have been endorsed has proceeded slowly. The Ministry of Finance and relevant line ministries have continued to map out projects within the programmes and to increase engagement with donors on project financing modalities. Two national priority programmes remain to be endorsed, on law and justice for all and on transparency and accountability. The Government reported some progress towards ratification of a national audit law and the streamlining of building permit procedures by the municipality of Kabul, as required by international partners before final backing of the transparency and accountability programme. Asset declarations for 7,000 high-ranking government officials have been submitted, and donors continue to press for a credible verification process. The United Nations has provided technical assistance and facilitated technical-level discussions between the Government and

donors to support the finalization of the programme on law and justice for all. On 23 May, a second draft was submitted to donors for comment.

34. The Ministry of Finance engaged with donors on the implementation of the aid management policy — the framework guiding national priority programme financing and a key international commitment in Tokyo — and on defining joint implementation priorities for 2013. Commitment to ensuring that each donor has a development framework agreement with the Government was a significant step given the complexities inherent in coordinating aid in Afghanistan, and is in line with global best practices.

35. On 6 March, the special tribunal for the Kabul Bank affair found 21 former banking officials guilty on a variety of charges related to the $980 million fraud that severely affected the country's financial system in 2010 and required an international bailout. The former Chair and the former Chief Executive Officer of Kabul Bank were each given five-year prison sentences, while the 19 other defendants were sentenced to jail for between two and five years. The Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee expressed disappointment at the relatively light sentences. That the verdicts were not based on money-laundering charges presents significant challenges to recovering offshore funds. Assistance in forensic auditing is currently being provided and additional charges may follow. Implementation of the Tokyo Framework requires tangible progress on issues of accountability and transparency.

V. Development and humanitarian assistance

36. On 15 April, United Nations country team representatives from Afghanistan and Pakistan held a one-day meeting in Islamabad to reach a shared understanding of the post-2014 environment in the region. Resident coordinators from both countries chaired the meeting and my Special Representative for Disaster Risk Reduction, Margareta Wahlström, attended. Participants agreed to strengthen collaboration in the following areas: subnational governance; remote and risk management; disaster risk reduction and management; contingency planning; and cross-border issues. In Afghanistan, work continued on a common country assessment to inform the development of the post-2015 United Nations development assistance framework. The development of a macro-country framework will be followed by an assessment of agreed-upon key sectors and development challenges: inclusive economic growth; accountable governance; humanitarian action; service delivery; and environmental management.

37. On 24 April, an earthquake in the eastern provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar claimed 15 lives. In addition, 84 people were wounded and 3,000 homes were destroyed. As at 14 May, spring floods across 19 provinces had killed 36 people and affected some 40,000. Flooding was at lower levels than recent years, given a mild winter with reduced snowfall. Between 13 and 17 April, Ms. Wahlström visited Afghanistan and met government officials and local stakeholders. She observed an improvement in disaster response but noted that overall national capacity remained weak and that coordination and integration across line ministries was required. The goal for the 2013 Common Humanitarian Action Plan is $471 million, but as at 31 May only $235 million (50 per cent of the goal) had been contributed.

38. During the first four months of 2013, 10,934 refugees returned voluntarily to Afghanistan, a decrease of 6 per cent compared with the same period in 2012. On 31 March, the United Nations and the Government of Afghanistan agreed to form a committee, chaired by Second Vice-President Mohammad Karim Khalili, to bring together key ministries and the United Nations country team to seek joint solutions and integrated approaches for refugees and internally displaced persons, also in the context of my framework on ending displacement in post-conflict situations.

39. To date in 2013 there have been increasing levels of internal displacement as a consequence of hostilities, often in isolated areas of the country, in particular in districts in the northern and southern regions, where humanitarian access is hampered by remoteness and insecurity. After police checkpoints in three districts of Faryab Province were attacked on 22 April, two weeks of hostilities ensued, temporarily displacing an estimated 2,000 families. On 20 May, attacks on government checkpoints and subsequent fighting by armed opposition groups led to the displacement of an estimated 4,000 families in Helmand Province. Humanitarian actors have found it increasingly difficult to gain access to remote areas owing to insecurity and have received reports of civilians facing problems moving to areas of safety.

40. By the end of April, two cases of polio had been reported in the eastern region, one in Nangarhar Province and the other in Kunar Province. The southern region, one of the most volatile in terms of polio virus circulation, has reported no cases since November. National immunization campaigns held from 10 to 12 March and from 21 to 23 April targeted the country's estimated 8.2 million children under 5 years of age. Additional campaigns continued in 11 low-performing districts in the south; this aggressive approach should continue in the second half of 2013. Better monitoring and causal analysis of inaccessibility, as well as closer liaison with communities, have improved access. On 13 May, the Taliban released a statement in which it expressed support for immunization programmes that respect Islamic values and local cultural conditions.

41. A total of 15 km^2 of mine-contaminated land was cleared in the reporting period, benefiting 20 communities and 30,000 individuals. Owing to insufficient funding, however, 3,000 demining staff have become unemployed since the beginning of 2013. Afghanistan now runs the risk of missing the first annual goals under its approved 10-year extension request for implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Accidents involving mines and explosive remnants of war have killed or injured an average of 47 people per month since January, up from an average of 30 per month in 2012. Accidents in formerly off-limit areas in and around bases and facilities from which international military forces have recently withdrawn and to which local populations are now gaining access are included in the figures.

42. On 7 and 8 May, the ministers of labour, the economy and social affairs co-chaired a conference on creating sustainable jobs in Kabul. Supported by the United Nations and the World Bank, the event brought together more than 300 participants from key ministries, workers' and employers' organizations, academia and the donor community. Participants identified priorities — improving competitiveness and ensuring job-rich growth, developing demand-driven skills and

managing and stimulating labour migration — and next steps, including refining the Afghan national employment policy and developing a national employment strategy.

43. From 17 to 19 May, the Director General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Irina Bokova, visited Afghanistan, where she met with President Karzai and senior government officials to discuss the role of education and culture as pillars of nation-building. With parliamentarians and women's groups, Ms. Bokova expressed concern over possible setbacks for women after 2014 and emphasized the need to provide assurances that they are full members of society. In a meeting with the Minister of Education, Ms. Bokova stressed the importance of girls' and women's education as a fundamental right and as a key to reducing poverty, improving health, raising incomes and promoting political participation.

VI. Counter-narcotics

44. The second and final phase of the 2013 Opium Risk Assessment, produced by the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics and the United Nations, focused on the north and north-east and confirmed a likely increase in opium poppy cultivation for the third consecutive year. It indicates that the poppy-free status of Balkh, Takhar and Faryab Provinces is at risk unless timely measures are implemented. If current trends continue, the total number of opium poppy-free provinces in 2013 would drop to 14, down from 17 in 2012 and 20 in 2010. Badakhshan Province, the largest site of cultivation in the north-east, is likely to see an increase in cultivation. The assessment reiterated that there was a strong association between insecurity, lack of agricultural assistance and opium poppy cultivation. Villages with poor security and that did not receive agricultural assistance in 2012 were significantly more likely to grow opium poppy in 2013 than communities with good security and that did receive support or had been reached by relevant awareness-raising campaigns.

45. In his 10-year vision, the Minister of the Interior recognized counter-narcotics as a priority and underscored the need for autonomous counter-narcotics capacity within the Ministry. Outstanding questions regarding the command and control arrangements of the counter-narcotics police in the provinces remain to be determined. As at 27 May, governor-led eradication activities had been concluded in Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Nangarhar, Laghman, Uruzgan, Herat, Kunar, Daikundi, Zabul, Kapisa, Balkh, Badghis and Farah Provinces and were being carried out in Kunar, Badakhshan, Faryab and Ghor Provinces. To date, 5,282 ha of opium poppy crops have been eradicated. In these efforts, 131 lives have been lost, including those of 27 police officers, 4 Afghan Local Police officers, 9 Afghan army personnel, 1 driver and 90 others. Another 87 people were injured. By the same period in 2012, a total of 10,413 ha of poppy crops had been eradicated under governors' initiatives, 100 lives had been lost and 122 people had been injured.

46. On 23 and 24 April, a seminar organized by the United Nations on regional challenges in addressing the problem of illicit drugs in Central Asia in the context of the Afghan transition was held in Dushanbe. Participants included representatives of the five Central Asian countries, Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan, as well as regional and subregional organizations. Participants in the seminar assessed regional security dynamics, trends in illicit drug production and trafficking, the impact of drug-related organized crime on the State and the role of

international and regional organizations. On 9 and 10 April, the sixth meeting of financial intelligence units in the region was held in Almaty under the Criminal Assets Southern Hub initiative in cooperation with the Central Asian Regional and Information Coordination Centre and under the United Nations-led Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries. Seven countries and donors discussed money-laundering, the financing of terrorism and information exchange on suspicious financial transactions. The United Nations was requested to develop a road map to promote more efficient cross-border work on money-laundering, to be finalized by the end of 2013 following consultations with Governments participating in the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries. On 7 and 8 May, the Regional Intelligence Working Group on Precursor Chemicals met in Dushanbe to share information on the latest seizures of controlled substances.

VII. Mission support

47. The Mission is currently working on the budget proposal for 2014/15. It is hoped that, despite the 18.7 per cent reduction in funding for UNAMA in 2013, it will be possible to avoid further large-scale disruption and organizational change in 2014, during the delicate transition period. Cost savings and increased efficiencies will be implemented and the Mission's operations are undergoing reassessment and prioritization, including through a staffing review. Lower vacancy rates, staff cost increases and pressure on operating costs mean that even a zero-growth budget would result in a reduction in real value. The decommissioning of the UNAMA regional jet, which flies regularly between Kabul and Dubai, will save $6.2 million annually. UNAMA is putting in place standby arrangements with regional carriers for in extremis support.

48. Having closed nine field offices, UNAMA has been developing more flexible and cost-effective models for mandate implementation, to expand and contract activities in coordination with the United Nations country team, as programme requirements and opportunities evolve. Developing and maintaining networks and relationships nationwide, UNAMA has focused on carrying out more joint missions to areas without a permanent UNAMA field presence. Representatives of UNAMA and the country team travelled together on overnight visits to Paktika, Ghazni, Helmand, Zabul, Nimroz, Ghor and Badghis.

49. Amid reorganization and in support of the wider United Nations family, 15 armoured vehicles were transferred from UNAMA to Bamako on 29 April for use by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. An additional 15 vehicles were transferred, on 21 May, to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.

50. The Kuwait Joint Support Office continued to make progress, as planned, in integrating the support provided to UNAMA and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq and consolidating existing business practices. Key deliverables include drafting service-level agreements and related key performance indicators for human resources and financial transaction processes and providing support for the implementation of United Nations global initiatives, including the International Public Sector Accounting Standards, Umoja and Inspira.

VIII. Observations

51. One year after the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan, it is important to reflect on progress made towards a stable and sustainable political and economic transition. I expect that, at a meeting to be held in Kabul in July, senior officials will frankly assess the status of mutual commitments between the Government and the international community. The level of support that the international community has pledged to Afghanistan for the coming decade is extraordinary. That support needs to be delivered predictably and in ways that strengthen national ownership. The Government, in turn, is responsible for making progress in meeting the needs and aspirations of the Afghan people. Accountability and demonstrable results are essential to a robust partnership and sustained international support.

52. A legitimate succession in leadership is key to the political transition. Reaching an agreement on the rules of the game will do much to enhance the credibility of the electoral process and the acceptability of its outcome. Delays in the passage of electoral laws have added uncertainty among Afghan stakeholders over the intention of holding timely elections using a sound process that would provide a level playing field for all candidates. The substance of the legislation is that Afghans should be the ones to decide, but agreement is urgently needed on a consultative mechanism for appointing members to elections bodies — thus enabling a broadly accepted Chair to be named to the Independent Election Commission — and an impartial complaints mechanism. Goodwill and compromise will be required on all sides. Legislative consensus will aid in keeping the political momentum and underpin technical preparations.

53. I am encouraged by the fact that the Independent Election Commission has agreed on timelines, operational frameworks and proposed polling sites a year ahead of election day — an unprecedented achievement in Afghanistan. I urge Afghan security institutions to ensure similar momentum for securing the electoral process and ensuring broad and inclusive participation. An agreement on appropriate funding modalities must also be reached urgently. UNAMA has been actively facilitating discussions among members of the international community and between donors and Afghan authorities to reach agreements that recognize the requirements not only of sovereignty and sustainability but also of donor accountability. It has also worked, pursuant to its mandate, to promote inclusive dialogue between political stakeholders. The e-taskera project, while being of great national import, is a mid- to long-term endeavour that will have limited impact during the 2014/15 electoral cycle. Securing the necessary funding can help ensure the greatest utility possible in the time remaining, but the emphasis must be on sustainability, not speed.

54. Pluralism and vigorous public debate are equally necessary to ensure a level electoral contest. I am heartened by the vibrant media and civil society participation to date. Individuals and political parties should present clear platforms and agendas as soon as possible, to enable constituents to make clear choices about their country's future.

55. The other major line of political effort for stability and development is the peace process. UNAMA has increased its outreach and capacity-building efforts, to help facilitate an increasingly unified, coherent Afghan vision of the future and promote national dialogue. To that end, the Mission's work on regional cooperation

and its national reach, including through a unique network of field offices, are essential. Continued delay in establishing an office in Doha for representatives of the Taliban authorized to talk with the High Peace Council may feed doubts about this more formal line of effort. I reiterate the need for a coherent Afghan-led process. UNAMA stands ready to provide assistance, including by facilitating a track II initiative under the United Nations umbrella.

56. The recent increase in tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan are of concern. While I am encouraged by the positive exchanges that have taken place between the leaders of the two countries following the elections in Pakistan, I appeal to both Governments to focus on building trust to prevent confrontation and an inflamed public sentiment. Regional cooperation is critical to stability and economic development. The declaration adopted in Almaty has added momentum to the Istanbul Process. I encourage countries of the "heart of Asia" region, supporting nations and international and regional organizations to continue making progress with regard to developing a framework for political dialogue, concrete initiatives and confidence-building that is truly owned by regional actors, and to work towards the full potential and financial sustainability of such a framework.

57. Business confidence is weakened by uncertainty. A serious focus on sustainable revenue mobilization and regulatory frameworks that encourages private sector growth is required. Corruption and the illicit economy — including that resulting from a rise in opium poppy cultivation for the third year running — are chronic and damaging to inclusive growth and, ultimately, donor interest. The handing down of relatively light sentences to 21 people involved in the collapse of the Kabul Bank must not signal the end of accountability in this scandal. Robust and ongoing action, in particular on asset recovery and sound financial regulation, are essential. Demonstrations of commitment to sound institutional and financial fundamentals will be critical to ensuring sustained international assistance.

58. Another key commitment made by the Government in Tokyo is related to sustaining and strengthening the gains made by women in Afghanistan in the past decade. Women's empowerment and standing in public life is not only a matter of human rights but also central to unlocking the full economic and social capital of Afghanistan. The heated debate that has emerged in Afghanistan has demonstrated the fragile nature of such progress. Every effort must be made to safeguard the achievements of the Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women, in line with the international commitments of Afghanistan.

59. The armed conflict has exacted a heavy toll on civilians, and I am gravely concerned by the 25 per cent increase in civilian casualties that was recorded in the present quarter, after a decrease in 2012 (as noted in A/67/778-S/2013/133, of 5 March 2013). Using terror as a primary tactic, anti-Government elements continue to target civilian Afghan officials and public locations with the indiscriminate use of suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices. The Taliban's statement that judges and prosecutors are acceptable targets is in violation of the international legal distinctions between civilians and combatants. Recent attacks on humanitarian organizations are also of great concern. A more brutal phase of the conflict, focused on civilians, will only entrench and deepen animosities and cycles of violence. I call on all parties to respect international humanitarian law.

60. As the security transition proceeds, so the nature of the conflict continues to evolve. Moreover, anti-Government groups, local power brokers and criminal

networks vie for power and control of resources, including the narcotics industry, in a series of shifting alliances and local contests. Simple assessments of the violence based on numbers alone can be misleading. The real test of security is whether people feel confident in their daily lives and future prospects. As increasingly competent and capable Afghan forces assume the lead responsibility for security across the country, it will be critical for them to demonstrate their capacity to protect the population in order to build confidence. Security problems and internal and external challenges remain. Given that Afghan security institutions are still developing and lack some critical enablers, there will necessarily be risks, delays and setbacks. Long-term international support remains critical not only for political and economic certainty, but also to build public confidence in the Afghan security forces and to avoid the risk of communities seeking alternative sources of security.

61. Strengthening the accountability and oversight of security and judicial institutions is an essential part of sovereignty. The recent release of detainees found to be imprisoned illegally is encouraging. Robust, ongoing efforts must continue to prevent, and ensure accountability for, the torture and ill treatment of detainees.

62. I commend the efforts made by all parties to secure and implement recent immunization campaigns. Nevertheless, I note that, amid a complex humanitarian situation, humanitarian agencies expect hostilities in remote areas to increase and that this will subsequently lead to displacement and affect the ability of humanitarian actors to access populations. I note the urgency of putting measures in place to ensure that the displaced have the opportunity to seek safety and access to humanitarian assistance. For the over half a million people who have been displaced by conflict and who are likely to remain dependent on aid, as well as for returning refugees and migrants, reliance on humanitarian efforts alone is not a sustainable solution. Afghan institutional capacity for disaster preparedness and response must also receive increasing attention from Afghan authorities and donors, with clearly defined roles and responsibilities.

63. Discussion is under way within the United Nations and with key Afghan and international stakeholders on how to prepare for the challenges and opportunities of the transition and beyond. On the path to normalization, the United Nations is committed to assist Afghanistan in strengthening its sovereignty, its political framework, its institutional capacity for service delivery and its economic self-sufficiency. Agencies too will increasingly focus their policy and capacity-building expertise on assisting national and local institutions and organizations to build and sustain effective systems of delivery. I reiterate that the Mission's core tasks are to provide good offices and political outreach in support of Afghan-led political, reconciliation and regional processes and to promote respect for human rights and development coherence. While a different form of engagement, one that strengthens sovereignty and national ownership, will be required after 2014, I believe these key priorities will remain valid throughout the transition and beyond. A special political mission has a vital role in supporting the Government of Afghanistan and the Afghan people and in facilitating constructive engagement with the international community in ensuring that commitments are met and have demonstrable impact.

64. The foundations of the institutions of Afghanistan are largely in place but remain subject to complex and deep-seated security, humanitarian and capacity challenges. The uncertainty of the transition period and the scale of reliance on external resources create their own dynamics. In a period of great flux, it is crucial

that the goal of a strong, increasingly self-sufficient and sovereign country with institutions able to secure and serve the population remains at the forefront of all efforts.

65. I would like to express my gratitude to all national and international staff members of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and to my Special Representative, Ján Kubiš, for their continued dedication, often under challenging conditions, to fulfilling our commitments in support of the people of Afghanistan.